

5 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy

SUBJECT : Conversation with Andrew Marshall  
on 4 October 1972

1. The following comments are submitted for your possible background use in view of your scheduled meeting with Andy next week.

2. I lunched with Andy in his office, at his invitation, on Wednesday and his primary interest was exploring the background of the DCI letter of 28 September to Dr. Kissinger concerning guidance on current intelligence reporting. (Dr. Kissinger is not yet aware of the letter since it was routed directly to Andy).

3. I described the circumstances of your and my meeting with the DCI and, in response to questions, told Andy that although the letter was strictly the DCI's own initiative I did not consider that it represented any real concern on his part that corrective action was called for. I expressed the personal belief that the DCI merely recognized this as a policy issue on which guidance would be appropriate and that he may have been spurred to sending the memorandum in part because he recognized he had not raised a policy issue with the NSCIC Chairman since the Committee was created almost a year ago.

4. Andy is puzzled about the type of approach to draft and I suggested -- again in response to questions -- that perhaps Dr. Kissinger should set forth his views as to the adequacy of the current intelligence support which is provided to the White House and other top levels of the government and that, even though he is not familiar with the details of the publications prepared within the military commands, he might express his views as to the extent to which operational responsibilities of these commands call for continuing emphasis on current intelligence reporting related to readiness requirements.

5. Andy said he couldn't see the White House directing a particular command to cut out its daily intelligence reporting, and I agreed. He also surmised that current intelligence reporting is probably not expensive in itself, and that in some areas it is mostly a cut-and-paste effort.

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6. Andy is considering taking the line that the DCI memorandum and the Kissinger response represents merely the opening of a dialogue on current intelligence reporting, and that Dr. Kissinger might suggest "where the situation is not well enough defined."

7. Turning to a discussion of Tuesday's Working Group meeting, Andy said he felt the studies of manpower and costs trends and of current intelligence publications served a good function by raising issues which the group could consider and providing a means by which good questions can be raised as to how to design studies which will clarify the issues which are identified.

8. He feels that the PRG/IC should "co-opt larger groups of people to work on its studies" and said he was willing to help devise terms of resources for such studies, and to assist in identifying key issues which should be raised.

9. Again referring to Tuesday's meeting, Andy expressed considerable concern as to how to cope with those who say their experts are too busy to be made available for study efforts. He said that [redacted] of DIA (who had been selected to head the LAMSON 719 task group) really wants to go ahead with the study after the election, so Andy is thinking of again proposing that the study get underway.

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10. I told him I really had expected that the studies under his cognizance would be handled by personnel from outside the intelligence community and call on the intelligence organizations only for information needed for the evaluation, but that instead the studies had thusfar primarily involved having intelligence officials review and comment on their own efforts, with Andy providing the only outside overview. He recognized that this was a problem, but he had no real expectation of being able to operate much differently.

[redacted]

Chief, PRG/IC

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